Pittsburgh University School of Law

Scholarship@PITT LAW
Articles

Faculty Publications

2012

Arab Spring, Libyan Liberation and the Externally Imposed
Democratic Revolution
Haider Ala Hamoudi
University of PIttsburgh School of Law, hamoudi@pitt.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.pitt.edu/fac_articles
Part of the Arabic Studies Commons, Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, International Law
Commons, Islamic World and Near East History Commons, and the Legal History Commons

Recommended Citation
Haider A. Hamoudi, Arab Spring, Libyan Liberation and the Externally Imposed Democratic Revolution, 89
Denver University Law Review 699 (2012).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.pitt.edu/fac_articles/105

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship@PITT LAW. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@PITT LAW. For more
information, please contact leers@pitt.edu, shephard@pitt.edu.

ARAB SPRING, LIBYAN LIBERATION AND THE
EXTERNALLY IMPOSED DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION
HAIDER ALA HAMOUDIt
For generations, the United States of America has played a unique
role as an anchor of global security and advocate for human freedom.
Mindful of the risks and costs of military action, we are naturally reluctant to use force to solve the world's many challenges. But when
our interests and values are at stake, we have a responsibility to act.
-Barack Obama, March 28, 2011 (justifying the NATO intervention
in Libya).
I. INTRODUCTION
Contemporary events in the Arab world should cause us to wonder
what happened to our commitment to the democratic revolution. America's understanding of its own role in supporting democratic orders is, as
a result of the so-called Arab Spring, as confused as it has ever been. I
hope in these few pages to expound upon these ideas of democractic
commitments and their consequences, which must command greater consideration.
In particular, I want to explore a central irony in our times concerning the externally imposed democratic revolution.2 On the one hand,
many of us across the entire American political spectrum adhere to the
principle of democratic rule as core normative commitment.3 We believe
in a moral conception of government wherein authority may only derive
its powers from the consent of the governed, a principle reflected in two
cornerstone and foundational documents that conceptualized human
rights in modernity-the Universal Declaration of Human Rights4 and
Assistant Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law.
t
1. Ben Feller, Obama Libya Speech Strongly Defends Intervention, THE HUFFINGTON POST
(Mar. 28, 2011, 8:28 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/03/28/obama-libya-speechn_841311 .html#text (for the full text of the speech, follow the hyperlink at the end of the article).
I should note at the outset that I borrow the term "externally imposed revolution" from
2.
Andrew Arato's commendable work on the Iraq Constitution. ANDREW ARATO, CONSTITUTION
MAKING UNDER OCCUPATION: THE POLITICS OF IMPOSED REVOLUTION IN IRAQ 1 (2009).

Again, President Obama's speech justifying the Libya intervention is instructive. While
3.
offering a litany of reasons as to why humanitarian intervention was justified, in a manner described
more fully in Part IV hereof, the President made an implicit reference to something akin to a "domino theory" of tyranny that offered a robust commitment to support the democratic "impulses" that
had to that time convulsed the Arab world. See Feller,supra note 1.
4.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, art. 21, 1 3, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/217(lll) (Dec. 10, 1948) ("The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal
and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.").
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the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights. On the other
hand, there seems to be a broad consensus that views forcible regime
change of tyrannies into regimes of democratic rule as a per se illegitimate interference into the affairs of other nations, a position likewise
conceptualized as foundational in the United Nations Charter. Where
our praise for democracy is nearly universal, and there is no end to the
laudations we are willing to heap upon citizens who are willing to sacrifice their lives and their freedom in its name in their own tyrannical
states, 7 we grow timid when asked to bear similar burdens abroad. We
are worried that somehow to do so would be to engage in "unsupervised
meddling in the processes of choice within other states,"8 and that it
would therefore lack popular legitimacy.
The distinction as between our professed faith in democracy and our
almost politically correct unwillingness to "impose" it on other states is
remarkable, and in some ways conceptually difficult to support. For if a
people are the true foundation of the legitimacy of its government, then
by what right, and under what conception, could it possibly be that foreign intervention to remove a tyrant and restore to the people their natural right to rule themselves be itself denied legitimacy? How can the legitimacy of the state be judged as against the authority granted to it by its
people on the one hand, and by the position of a despot supported by no
such authority on the other? How can any reasonable person who takes
her normative commitment to democracy seriously claim that in a conflict between a foreign invader committed to restoring democratic rule
and an unspeakable tyrant committed to denying it, legitimacy to rule lies
necessarily, ipso facto, with the tyrant by virtue of nothing other than
nationality? The irony is particularly disturbing when the repression is
itself foreign, albeit undertaken at the request of the tyrant. That is to say,
somehow there is international legitimacy in Saudi Arabia providing
troops at the Bahraini tyrant's request in order to repress a popular uprising.9 Illegitimacy would have ensued only if a nation somehow intervened to support the Bahraini people against a remorseless tyrannical
monarchical family utterly lacking in the most basic understandings of
5.
International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI) A, art. 25,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/2200(XXI) (Dec. 16, 1966) ("Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, ... without unreasonable restrictions: (a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or
through freely chosen representatives; (b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections
which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the
free expression of the will of the electors . . .. ").
6. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 (prohibiting the threat or use of force against the political
independence or territorial sovereignty of member states).
7.
For a recent noteworthy example relating to the Arab Spring in particular, see Nicholas D.
Kristof,Release My Friend!,N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2011, at A27.
8.
W. Michael Reisman, Assessing Claims to Revise the Laws of War, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 82,
89 (2003).
9. See Ethan Bronner & Michael Slackman, Saudis, Fearful of1ran, Send Troops to Bahrain
to Quell Protests, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2011, at Al (describing the entry of Saudi troops into Bahrain at the Bahraini monarch's request for the purposes of suppressing a popular uprising).
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decency, let alone tolerance.' 0 To the committed democrat, something is
amiss under such a conception.
We strain hard to find our ways out of this morass of respect for
sovereignty on the one hand and commitment to democracy on the other.
We search for any plausible reason, no matter how irrelevant or beside
the point, to justify intervention to institute democratic rule. In other
words, at times we seek to institute democratic rule, but we look for a
different reason to justify our action. It is as if the democratic commitment in such matters is something to be embarrassed by rather than to be
proud of.
The most popular form of indirect legitimation of democratic intervention involves hinging the regime change to some other, more recognized form of international interference with sovereignty. Most notably,
it is legitimate, experts maintain, to engage in regime change in particular circumstances where there was a preexisting reason to initiate war in
the first place, as in Japan after the Second World War, or Afghanistan
following the events of September 11, 2001." While such sorts of inter10. The outrages committed by the Bahraini government against its own people are well
documented by respected human rights organizations and are described to some extent later in this
Article. Such outrages include systematic attacks on those who provided medical care to protestors,
as well as the injured protestors themselves, Bahrain: Systematic Attacks on Medical Providers,
HUM. RTS. WATCH (July 18, 2011), http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/07/18/bahrain-systematicattacks-medical-providers; dismissals of workers and expulsions of students for participating in prodemocracy rallies, Bahrain: Revoke Summary Firings Linked to Protests, HUM. RTS. WATCH (July
14, 2011), http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/07/14/bahrain-revoke-summary-firings-linked-protests;
the killing of dozens of protestors engaged in peaceful protests, including a 14-year-old boy, Teenage Activist Killed in Bahrain Protest, AMNESTY
INT'L (Aug.
31,
2011),
http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/teenage-activist-killed-bahrain-protest-2011-08-31;
and the prosecution of teachers by military tribunal, Teachers to Be Tried By a Military Court,
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/
2011),
23,
INT'L
(Aug.
AMNESTY
Such inciMDE11/043/2011/en/dd5fdlea-alde-406c-b69b-f56328aaf5a0/mdel10432011en.pdf.
dents have continued unabated long after the outbreak of the Arab Spring in 2011, often meeting
with denials on the part of the Bahraini authorities that border on the farcical. Hence, for example, at
the end of January, 2012, a nineteen year old opposition figure was arrested and died while in police
custody, after being allegedly run over by a police car. The Bahraini government claims he was
never injured by the police, and in fact died of "natural causes"; specifically, sickle cell anemia.
CNN Wire Staff, 4 Killed in Protests in Bahrain, Opposition Group Says, CNN, (Jan. 27, 2012,
12:22 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/01/27/world/meast/bahrain-unrest/index.html?iref-allsearch.
In addition, the Bahraini government commissioned a group of experts, led by the well-respected M.
Cherif Bassiouni, to investigate complaints about human rights abuses committed during the height
of the uprising in February and March of 2011. That report, despite its being commissioned by the
Bahraini monarch, contains devastating allegations respecting police misconduct and broad human
rights abuses. See BAHRAIN INDEPENDENT COMMISSION OF INQUIRY, REPORT OF THE BAHRAIN

INDEPENDENT COMMISSION OF INQUIRY (2011), http://files.bici.org.bhfBICireportEN.pdf. These are
but a fraction of the reported incidents of gross human rights violations designed to impede democratic rule. For further details on these and other matters, see the websites of both Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch.
I1. Citing the example of Kosovo, the inestimable public international law scholar Michael
Reisman indicates that "regime change may be internationally lawful when it is the contextually
appropriate instrument of an intrinsically lawful action." Reisman, supra note 8, at 89 (emphasis in
original); see also ARATO, supra note 2, at 34 (pointing out that one distinction as between Germany
and Japan after the Second World War on the one hand and Iraq on the other was that the former two
states were the aggressors in their respective conflicts).
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vention have a long and storied modem history, from Germany 2 and
Japan to Cambodia" and Uganda,14 the potential for their use has grown
exponentially as a new (to date, still controversial) basis for intervention
into the affairs of sovereign states has arisen. This is the "responsibility
to protect," designed to prevent future humanitarian catastrophes that
resemble the Rwandan genocide of 1994.'" Indeed, in contemporary Libya it was precisely this doctrine, and the concomitant endorsement of the
principle by the Security Council,' 6 that President Obama and NATO
made use of to initiate hostilities against Qaddafi's regime.'
Yet this approach raises its own concerns, in the first place because
of the obvious opportunity for doublespeak it affords. The Security
Council Resolution that authorized force against Libya quite evidently
did not authorize regime change in favor of democratic rule and against
brutal tyranny.' 8 Yet it is difficult to maintain that NATO's bombing
campaign was designed (at least beyond its earliest stages) to protect
civilians from a humanitarian catastrophe rather than to remove a globally despised tyrant who had rendered his nation a caricature and replace
his regime with a democratic government.1' If NATO is permitted to
12.

The reference here, of course, is to the well-known occupation of Germany following the

Second World War. PETER H. MERKL, THE ORIGIN OF THE WEST GERMAN REPUBLIC 6 (1963).

13.

Vietnam invaded Cambodia in 1979 to put an end to the Khmer Rouge regime, which had

in four years caused 1.7 million deaths. BEN KIERNAN, THE POL POT REGIME: RACE, POWER, AND
GENOCIDE IN CAMBODIA UNDER THE KHMER ROUGE, 1975-79, at 450-52 (3d ed. 2008); Khmer

Rouge, Times Topics, N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations
/k/khmer rouge/index.html (last updated Nov. 21, 2011).
14. After various border clashes, Tanzania invaded Uganda to end the horrific rule of Idi
Amin, whose human rights violations, including the murder of hundreds of thousands of civilians,
were legendary. TONY AVIRGAN & MARTHA HONEY, WAR IN UGANDA: THE LEGACY OF IDI AMIN
76(1982).
15.
Carlo Focarelli, The Responsibility to Protect Doctrine and HumanitarianIntervention:
Too Many Ambiguitiesfor a Working Doctrine, 13 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 191, 191-94 (2008).
16. S.C. Res. 1973, 1| 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1973 (Mar. 17, 2011).
17. Obama's principal reliance on a responsibility to protect was unambiguous. Feller, supra
note I ("Gaddafi declared that he would show 'no mercy' to his own people. He compared them to
rats, and threatened to go door to door to inflict punishment. In the past, we had seen him hang
civilians in the streets, and kill over a thousand people in a single day. Now, we saw regime forces
on the outskirts of the city. We knew that if we waited one more day, Benghazi-a city nearly the
size of Charlotte-could suffer a massacre that would have reverberated across the region and
stained the conscience of the world. It was not in our national interest to let that happen. I refused to
let that happen. And so nine days ago, after consulting the bipartisan leadership of Congress, I authorized military action to stop the killing and enforce UN Security Council Resolution 1973.").
18. Security Council Resolution 1973 in fact only authorizes force "to protect civilians and
civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi,
while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory." S.C. Res.
1973, supra note 16, 14.
19. This matter, respecting the extent to which NATO was more engaged in regime change
than it was in protecting civilians, at least beyond its initial stages, is the subject of Part IV. It suffices to note for now, however, that the seeming disjunction between NATO's stated aims of humanitarian intervention and its apparent, ultimate objective of regime change was not a matter that went
without comment in the popular media. See, e.g., Steven Erlanger, Libya's Dark Lesson for NATO,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2011, at SR4 ("More than six budget-busting months against one of the weakest
militaries in the world, with shortages of planes, weapons and ammunition that were patched over by
the pretense that NATO was acting simply to 'protect civilians,' when it was clear to everyone that
the alliance was intervening on one side of a civil war . . . .").
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clothe its regime change efforts under the dubious pretext of responsibility to protect, this merely privileges the next international actor seeking
pretext to engage in regime change to do the same. This may be well and
good to the extent that such interventions are humanitarian efforts to
institute democratic rule, but when undertaken for more nefarious purposes (acquisition of territory, intimidation of weaker neighbor, creation
of a pliable client state), the problems with doublespeak and pretext in
undertaking intervention become quite apparent.
Moreover, even if regime change could be justified as a means to
vindicate some other recognized principle of international law and relations, it is difficult to see how the imposition of democratic rule once
regime change was undertaken could be similarly justified. Nothing in
the Hague Convention grants the right to an occupier, justified or not in
its occupation, to institute democratic reform.20 Thus, resistance to such
reforms by even small numbers of post conflict elites would render such
reforms potentially suspect. Indeed by the standard of the Hague Convention, it was the Japanese Matsumoto Commission and not the United
States that had the better legal argument respecting the nature of the constitutional change to which Japan should be subjected."
The essential problem therefore remains-we believe in democracy,
and we seek to spread it, but are desperate to deny ourselves any right to
do so, engaging in any manner of subversion or deception to mask our
true intentions, as if we were in such ventures truly out to steal oil rather
than help to fulfill what we believe to be legitimate national aspirations
of other peoples.
While perhaps longstanding, this confusion respecting the role of
external powers in fomenting or supporting a domestic democratic revolution reached something of a crisis point with the eruption of the Arab
Spring. In state after Arab state, from Morocco in the west 2 2 to Bahrain23

In fact, the Hague Convention IV prohibits an occupier from making any change to the
20.
laws in force in the territory occupied "unless absolutely prevented." Convention Between the United States and Other Powers Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, art. 43, Oct. 18,
1907, 36 Stat. 2277 [hereinafter Hague Convention IV].
Shortly after the war, a panel of senior Japanese legal scholars proposed a draft constitu21.
tion that bore a very close resemblance to Japan's historic Meiji Constitution, effectively retaining
the general legal and political regime of the state as it had long existed. RAY A. MOORE & DONALD
L. ROBINSON,

PARTNERS FOR DEMOCRACY:

CRAFTING THE NEW JAPANESE STATE UNDER

MACARTHUR 74 (2002). It was the United States that objected, drafting an alternative, radically
different Constitution in a matter of days and insisting on its enactment in the place of the Meiji
Constitution. Id at 106-08. By any reasonable standpoint, the United States had not adhered to the
terms of the Hague Convention IV in demanding such a radical change, in favor of liberal democracy, to territory under its occupation.
22.
Max Fisher, Will Morocco Be the Arab Spring's Next Greatest Success-or Great Failure?,
THE
ATLANTIC
(July
1,
2011,
6:59
AM),
http://www.theatlantic.com/intemational/archive/2011/07/will-morocco-be-the-arab-springs-greatsuccess-or-great-failure/241286/.
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and Yemen in the east,2 4 millions of protestors crowded the Arab streets,
demanding in most cases regime change, and this on the most basic of
democratic principles-because, to cite the familiar refrain heard by these brave demonstrators, "the people want the fall of the regime." 2 5 The
demand deserves emphasis. That these convulsions were self-evidently
democratic in spirit is demonstrated by that near uniform refrain, originating in Tunisia and widely popularized in Egypt's Tahrir Square, respecting "the people's" demand.26 The claim was neither that Mubarak
had transgressed against God, nor that Asad had failed to uphold the
principles of shari'a,but rather that the people had chosen to strip their
respective regimes of legitimacy, and that was enough. Learned scholars
had long told us that in this region law divorced from Islam would have
no legitimacy-that the only legal rules that could function would be
those believed to be from God. 27 Yet political legitimacy was being lo-

23. Cynthia Johnston, Bahrain Seeks Calm, Opposition Demands Constitution, REUTERS
PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/16/us-bahrain(Feb.
16,
2011,
6:48
idUSTRE7IE7FS20110216.
24. Cynthia Johnston & Frederick Richter, Old GuardFights Back Across Region: Protesters
in Bahrain to Bury Their DeadFriday After ProtestsAgainst Sunni-Minority Monarchy, EDMONTON
J., (Feb. 18, 2011), http://VWww2.canada.com/edmontonjoumal/news/story.html?id=elf91032-cl214c23-8a26-c6a6ffab0c90&p=1.
25. Haider Ala Hamoudi, The PEOPLE Want the Fallof the Regime, ISLAMIC LAW INOUR
TIMES: OR FOAM FROM A CAMEL'S MOUTH, SPEWING AND SUBSIDING (July 26, 2011, 1:37 PM),

http://muslimlawprof.org/2011/07/26/the-people-want-the-fall-of-the-regime-and-norwegianterrorism.aspx.
26. See Marwa Awad & Hugo Dixon, The Art of Revolution: Egypt's Nonviolent Warriors,
THE DAILY STAR (Apr. 14, 2011, 12:00 AM), http://www.dailystar.com.lb/Apr/14/The-art-ofrevolution-Egypts-nonviolent-warriors.ashx#axzzleTZGOg3O (describing chants in Tahrir Square);
J. David Goodman, Tunisian Protesters Watch Mubarak Trial with Envy, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15,
2011, 2:03 PM), http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/08/15/tunisian-protesters-watch-mubaraktrial-with-envy/; Hundreds Arrested in Syria Sweep: Activists, ABC NEWS (May 2, 2011, 2:56 PM),
Johnhttp://www.abc.net.aulnews/2011-05-02/hundreds-arrested-in-syria-sweep-activists/2697630;
ston, supra note 23; Johnston & Richter, supra note 24; So Far,So Pretty Good: Amid Trepidation,
the New Regime Is Making a Remarkably Hopeful Start, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 10, 2011, at 63.
27. Perhaps the most well-known and deeply respected proponents of such a theory is the
inestimable Wael Hallaq, who indicates in a notable essay as follows:
[A]n explanation must be provided as to the assumption underlying this question, namely,
the posited necessity for today's Muslims to live by a religious law. Since the middle of
the nineteenth century, Muslim societies have embarked on a course of identity crisis
caused, among other things, by the disappearance from their daily lives of the religious
structures that sustained them for over a millennium. One of these structures, and a central one at that, was Islamic law as a religious and pragmatic system. To say that this law
was "the core and kernel" of Islamic life is indeed to state the obvious. Thus, for these
societies to regain their cultural and religious identities, a form of Islamic law must obtain-and this for two good reasons. First, historically, Islamic societies have lived by a
religious law for over twelve centuries, and what made their identities what they have always been was their possession of a particular legal phenomenon. Islam has always been
a nomocracy. Indeed, Islamic societies and polities have throughout these centuries exemplified the highest form of what a nomocracy can be. Second, it is at present inconceivable that Muslims can or will want to transform their Weltanschauung into a Western
model of rationality and secularism. They view the modernity of the West as incompatible with their vision of morality and ethics, as having miserably failed in maintaining the
social fabric and in creating a coherent worldview or a meaningful cosmology. The truth
claims of Western reason and modernity seem diametrically oppositional and extremely
antithetical to the Islamic ethos. The "return to Islam" that we have been witnessing since
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cated by its masses in a different place altogether, one recognizable to
any committed democrat-with the people. Suddenly earnest and learned
efforts to undertake the "challenge" of finding liberal democracy
Islamically compatible seemed to have the problem precisely backward.2 8 It is the Islamist who has the challenge, who must justify recognition of shari'ain a polity that as a core normative matter locates political legitimacy not with God, but the people. 2 9 America's earlier attempts
at democratic revolution in the region, in the form of Iraq, had not only
led to (qualified) success, 30 but the notion had managed to spread
throughout the entire Arab region, to say nothing of Iran.
the Iranian Revolution is partly caused by this disenchantment with Western culture and
its products.
Wael B. Hallaq, Can the Shari'a Be Restored?, in ISLAMIC LAW AND THE CHALLENGES OF
MODERNITY 21, 42-43 (Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad & Barbara Freyer Stowasser eds., 2004). The
Arab Spring demonstrations do considerable violence to this essentialist position respecting the
importance of shari'a in modem Muslim societies. As is demonstrated in the main text, far from
rejecting "the truth claims of Western reason," these demonstrators quite self-evidently adopted truth
claims set forth in the Declaration of Independence (respecting the right of the people to alter or
abolish a government) and the Gettysburg Address (respecting government of, for and by the people)
more than anything in Islamic political history. This is not to say that Arab democrats seek to replicate their Western counterparts entirely and without modification, or even that, within a generally
secular polity, some role for Islamic law might well be retained. It is to say that the notion that there
is some starkly different political worldview at play in the Arab world is an increasingly difficult one
to support. To the extent this is so in the Arab world, it is emphatically even truer in those Muslim
states that have managed the transition to democratic and largely (though not necessarily entirely)
secular political regimes tolerably well, among them Turkey and Indonesia. See Landon Thomas Jr.,
Turkey Prospers by Turning East, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2010, at Al (describing Turkey's rise as a
regional economic power); Amelia H.C. Ylagan, Corporate Watch, Bus. WORLD (July 13, 2009),
2009 WLNR 13279690 (describing the effort by Morgan Stanley to include Indonesia as one of the
world's rapidly developing and influential economies, on par with Brazil, China, India and Russia).
28.

See generally KHALED ABou EL FADL, ISLAM AND THE CHALLENGE OF DEMOCRACY

(Joshua Cohen & Deborah Chasman eds., 2004).
To be clear, the challenge to the Islamist, to justify the use of religious law and religious
29.
argument in a liberal democratic state, is not an insurmountable one. This is a topic that has been the
subject of some debate between two of the greatest political philosophers of our era, Habermas and
Rawls. Compare Jurgen Habermas, Religion in the Public Sphere, 14 EUR. J. PHIL. 1, 8-9 (2006)
(arguing in favor of resort to religious argument as being compatible with liberal citizenship), with
JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 213 (expanded ed. 2005) (suggesting that argument must be

grounded in "public reason" accessible to all citizens). In addition, specifically in the Islamic context, Abdullahi An-Na'im has advocated a form of secular citizenship that more closely resembles
that of Rawls than Habermas, suggesting that ideal citizens would make resort to "civic reason."
ABDULLAHI AHMED AN-NA'IM, ISLAM AND THE SECULAR STATE: NEGOTIATING THE FUTURE OF
SHARI'A 7 (2008). In any event, it is not my purpose to contribute to this rich and enlightening
debate, but only to point out that the core normative political commitment among those who insist
the regime must fall because the "people" demand it is to popular democratic rule. All else, including the use of religious law, must be justified in relation to that, and not the reverse.
Respecting the limited, but real, success of the Iraqi democratic experiment after obvious
30.
initial difficulties, see Babak Dehghanpisheh et al., Rebirth ofa Nation, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 8, 2010, at
31.
Iran's recent "Green Revolution" likewise arose because of broad suspicions that the
31.
results of its 2008 presidential election had been manipulated so as to ensure a victory for the conservative Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. See Mark Tran & Julian Borger, Iran Elections: Ahmadinejad to
be Sworn in as President by August, GUARDIAN (June 23, 2009, 7:25 AM),
The protestors then
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/jun/23/iran-guardian-council-results.
continued to voice opposition even after the Supreme Leader, Ali Khamane'i, had urged them to
cease. Sadegh Zibakalam, Dismissing Iran 's 'Greens' Is Premature, THE DAILY STAR (May 10,
2010, 12:00 AM), http://www.dailystar.com.lb/Opinion/Commentary/May/10/Dismissing-Irans-
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And yet, during the Arab Spring and throughout its continuing aftermath, confusion has reigned respecting America's preferred response
to such broad vindications of its core normative values. This confusion is
caused, to some extent, by the obfuscation respecting America's supposed "responsibility to protect" civilians against slaughter. To take the
simplest example, if one regards the rhetoric respecting humanitarian
intervention seriously, it remains difficult to understand precisely what to
make of evolving attitudes toward Syria. The use of force by NATO,
akin to that used in Libya ostensibly to protect civilians, has never been
seriously contemplated, though Syria's regime has killed far more civilians than Qaddafi ever had an opportunity to. 32 Yet in contrast with Libya, American policy is decidedly confused.
On the one hand, there have been important expressions of sympathy with the Syrian democrats. This is best illustrated by the remarkable
and courageous decision of the United States Ambassador Robert Ford,
to visit areas where protests were strong and to meet with opposition
leaders at great risk to his own personal safety.33 The United States was
also quick to express outrage and even expel diplomats when particularly
gruesome reports of a civilian massacre appeared in the media. 34
Yet at the same time, the United States appears determined to work
exclusively within the United Nations, where it is obvious that nothing
substantive will be achieved because of continuing, well established Russian opposition. 35 As a result, there is no talk of a no-fly zone, or a safe
haven, or any other form of meaningful pressure. There is only, instead, a
U.N. endorsed peace plan that is so far from being implemented that it
bears scant resemblance to reality on the ground,36 and the dispatch of
greens-is-premature.ashx#ixzzlcrCJ2ZVq. Given the Supreme Leader's putative role as God's
representative "discovered" by humanity, the refusal to heed his wishes speaks volumes respecting
the extent to which the Iranian protesters held tightly to core democratic political commitments. See
Haider Ala Hamoudi, A State Which Claims Its Supreme LeaderIs 'Discovered' Has a Very Difficult
Time Running Itself by and Through Law, THE DAILY STAR (Oct. 1, 2009, 12:00 AM),
http://www.dailystar.com.lb/Law/Oct/0l/A-state-which-claims-its-supreme-leader-is-discoveredhas-a-very-difficult-time-running-itself-by-and.ashx#axzzlcrBX30vO (describing the role of Supreme Leader as being one divinely ordained within the Iranian political system).
32. As of March 27, 2012, the United Nations estimated that 9000 civilians had been killed in
the continuing Syrian assault on protestors. Louis Charbonneau & Michelle Nichols, U.N. Raises
Syria Death Toll Estimate to More than 9000, REUTERS (March 27, 2012),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/27/us-syria-toll-idUSBRE82QS820120327. By contrast, on
March 10, 2011, approximately two weeks from the imposition of the "no fly zone," CNN had
reported that between 1,000 and 2,000 protesters in Libya had been killed. Rebel Leader Calls for
"Immediate Action"
on No-Fly Zone, CNN
(Mar.
10,
2011,
5:02
AM),
http://edition.cnn.com/2011l/WORLD/africa/03/09/libya.civil.war/index.html.
33. David Hartwell, US. Ambassador to Return to Syria, GLOB. INSIGHT (Dec. 7,2011).
34. Elizabeth A. Kennedy, Nations Expel Syrian Envoys: Houla MassacreCould Prove To Be
Watershed Moment; U.S. Joins Eight Other Countries In Ousting Diplomats, AssoC. PRESS, May
30, 2012.
35. Patrick J. McDonnell, U.S.-Russia Clash on Syria Grows Louder, L.A. TIMES, June 1,
2012, at 3.
36. Elizabeth A. Kennedy, Analysts: Diplomacy Failing In Syria U.N. Blames Regime for the
Latest Round ofKillings, Violence, ASSOC. PRESS, July 14, 2012.
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corresponding toothless U.N. monitoring teams to Syria, which repeatedly demand the Syrian government to take action to limit civilian casualties, to no discernible effect. 7
Meanwhile, the situation appears to drag on, and democratic reform
within Syria seems less likely than civil war. Indeed, the International
Committee for the Red Cross has recently declared that the conflict has
reached the stage where it must be referred to as civil war.38 Precisely
how Syria has managed to earn such broad deference from the world's
democracies, while Libya did not, and under what normative or legal
conception all of this might be justified, remains a mystery. Certainly it
appears to have nothing whatsoever to do with a responsibility to protect
civilians from massacre.
In Bahrain, the rhetoric is even milder notwithstanding the popular
protests against it that convulsed the nation in February and March of
2011,39 and have continued sporadically through the start of 2012, demanding, once again, the fall of the regime. The problem, it seems, is not
so much that the Arab people have a problem locating legitimacy in rule
of the people. They have risked their lives to do so. It is more that NA TO
and the United States seem to have a hard time articulating these ideals,
exported though they are from the West, against the tyrannies that repress the same Arab people.
In other words, all of this obfuscation respecting responsibilities to
protect and the repeal of legitimacy from one state and not another suggests something deeply disturbing to the democrat-namely, that legitimacy to rule exists for tyrants under certain geopolitical circumstances
that have nothing to do with a constitutive conferring of that authority by
their people. This is hardly a realization of our democratic ideals. We
need a new formulation, one that does not bestow legitimacy upon some
repressive tyrants and not others.
This is not to say that the United States will realistically be engaging in regime change across the globe as against undemocratic regimes.
It is self-evident that any nation, the United States by no means an exception, will for a variety of reasons treat similarly situated nations differently. Yet let us call it what it is-pragmatic and painful accommodation to
geopolitical reality that has nothing to do with any particular tyrant's
legitimacy. Qaddafi had no legitimacy to rule when it became apparent
that his people conferred no authority upon him, and this (and not some
mythical responsibility to protect) is the reason that NATO found it justified to remove him. For strategic reasons, it may not always be expedient
37.
Id.
Neil MacFarquhar, Syria Denies Attack on Civilians, in Crisis Seen as Civil War, N.Y.
38.
TIMES, July 16, 2012, at A6.
39.
Joby Warrick & Michael Bimbaum, Questions as Bahrain Stifles Revolt, WASH. POST,
Apr. 15, 2011, at Al.
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to treat similar despots, those in Bahrain and in Syria for example, similarly. We can if we must negotiate with a tyrant. Yet this is not a reason
to deem that tyrant as possessing any sort of legitimacy to rule. When a
Bahraini monarch calls in a foreign army to put down protesters chanting
"the people want the fall of a regime," let us not suggest, even by implication, that the actions of such a monarch are entitled to any sort of respect on the basis of misguided notions of sovereignty. They cannot be,
as it is no more legitimate to a democrat to deny one's people their right
to rule than it is legitimate to deny another people a right to rule themselves. Suppression of popular uprising should be no more legitimate
than foreign invasion, even if each, from time to time, is tolerated, again
out of geopolitical necessity.
Put differently, if deference to Realpolitik limits our abilities, as is
probably inevitable, at the very least it should not limit our idealistic and
romantic normative commitments in favor of the democratic revolutionaries. Put into concrete terms, Libya, in the end, would have gone the
way of Bahrain had NATO chosen not to intervene in its affairs. If there
are sound geopolitical reasons that the removal of Qaddafi proves more
sanguine than that of Bahrain's tyrant monarch, then so be it, but let us at
least be honest respecting what these leaders are-unspeakable tyrants
with not an ounce of legitimate authority to undertake the actions they
did. The political legitimacy belongs in both cases to one and only one
entity-the people.
To be clear, this is not to say that all revolutions are democratic, and
that each popular upheaval deserves the support of those committed to
democracy. Patently, this is not true. A normative commitment to democracy as an ideal form of government is not the same as a messianic
and near-maniacal belief in its universal appeal to everyone, everywhere
at every time. It should be self-evident that populations overcome by
religious fervor, or obsessed with Marxist utopias, have in the past engaged in uprisings that were not premised on the principle of democratic
rule.4 0 This is to say nothing of poorer societies where states and effective state institutions are quite weak. 4 1 In such a state, the nature of national citizenship would be a difficult one to sustain among much of the
population, let alone democratic participation in the state. To attempt
democracy in such circumstances is a project doomed if not to failure,
then to substantial disappointment. I do not therefore quibble with the
proposition that one cannot effectively "impose" democracy on a state
that does not seek it. I do contest with some force the notion that a state
can be understood not to desire democracy merely because its institutions
40. See infra Part II.B for one such example, 1979 Iran, in detail.
Some commentators have described Yemen in this fashion. See, e.g., Ginny Hill, Yemen:
41.
Security and the Collapsing State, BBC NEWS (Mar. 28, 2011,
12:18 PM),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-l 1482963.
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have been captured by a tyrant who has managed to effectively suppress
his people.
External intervention is not precisely what comes to mind when one
speaks of a "democratic revolution." Usually, the idea is of democratic
revolutions of a different sort, indigenous ones. Foreign intervention, by
contrast, is dismissed as some sort of externally provoked coup rather
than what it has the potential to be, which is an externally supported
democratic revolution.. This is unfortunate, and in the balance of the
Article, I hope to demonstrate that if our normative commitment to democratic rule is as we say it is, we should not shy away from such democratic interventions (any more than we need be embarrassed by democratic revolution) but embrace them unapologetically and fervently, even
if for tactical and strategic reasons we are obviously unable to advance
them universally.
Part Two sets forth the manner in which the externally imposed
democratic regime change can and should be thought of more as a form
of democratic revolution than externally imposed coup. Part Two further
suggests that just as not all external impositions are illegitimate efforts to
acquire territory or create a neighboring client-state, so all internal revolutions are not necessarily democratic. A premier example of a nondemocratic revolution might be 1979 Iran, which stands in stark contrast with
the very democratic revolutions that currently convulse the Arab world
(and have shaken Iran in the recent past). Part Three of this Article outlines an alternative vision, one which rescues the democratic revolution
more fully, and clarifies the role of external agency in bringing it about.
Part Three also lays out how these ideas more fully conform to American
ideals in the context of the Arab Spring. Part Four, through the example
of Libya, demonstrates that in many ways the vision laid out herein is
already largely American policy. As a result, what is currently required is
not a fundamental reworking of American commitments and its actions
in relation thereto so much as a more honest expression of what those
commitments are, and their relationship to the externally imposed democratic revolution.
II.DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONS, INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL

A. Coups, Revolutions, Reforms and the Democratic Transformationof
the State
Perhaps it is best to begin by attempting to characterize precisely
what it is that is happening in the Arab world through the Arab Spring.
One possibility that can be immediately dismissed is to describe the recent events as being a series of coups.
42.

See Reisman, supra note 8, at 89.
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A conventional definition of a "coup" tends to involve the following
elements: (1) a very quick transformation over a matter of days, (2) necessarily entailing violence, (3) in which the leaders of the state are replaced by other leaders, (4) involving a small number of individuals with
some measure of political power, and (5) motivated by greed. 4 3 COups
are also most often taken in secret and therefore lack any sort of public
accountability." So defined and so understood, coups almost surely are
not grounded in any sense of popular legitimacy and would be problematic to any committed democrat.
Quite plainly, the events of the Arab Spring do not come close to
fitting this model. In fact, there is not a single criterion among those
above that would apply to the Arab Spring uprisings. Some of the criteria
are absolutely not met-for example, the transformation in Libya took
more than six months. 45 The notion that most of the other criteria have
been met could only be described as risible in its inaccuracy. These protests that led to the fall of the respective regimes were not just grounded
in popular legitimacy; they originated and sustained themselves on the
backs of tens of thousands of ordinary men and women who bravely took
to the streets seeking the fall of tyrants and the restoration of their human
dignity-at much risk to their lives and their fortunes in their respective
states. 46 Militaries may have been involved, either as caretakers following the deposing of a president in the case of Egypt, or in a blanket refusal to defend a tyrant in the case of Tunisia, but it was the people that
drove the transformation.47 To describe them as insiders, or motivated by
greed, or even relying upon the threat of violence to achieve their ends, is
to mischaracterize their motivations and their aspirations considerably.

43.

STEVEN R. DAVID, THIRD WORLD COUPS D'ETAT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 8

(1987).
44.

PAUL BROOKER, NON-DEMOCRATIC REGIMES: THEORY, GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS 63

(2000).
45. The Libyan uprising began with a series of demonstrations on February 16, 2011, against
the rule of Libya's strong man, Col. Muammar Qaddafi. Alan Cowell, Protests Take Aim at Leader
of Libya, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2011, at A14. The outcome was not settled until more than half-ayear later, in August of 2011, when the rebels finally took control of Qaddafi's compound in Tripoli.
Libya: The Fall of Tripoli-Wednesday 24 August 2011, GUARDIAN MIDDLE E. LIVE BLOG (Aug.
24, 2011, 8:41 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/middle-east-live/201 1/aug/24/libya-rebelstake-gaddafi-compound-live-updates.
46. Thomas Friedman, TlAm a Man', N.Y. TIMES, May 15,2011, at WKIO.
47. See Aya Batrawy & Sarah El Deeb, Egyptians Mark First Anniversary of 'Friday of
Rage',
THE
SALT
LAKE
TRIBUNE
(Jan.
27,
2012,
1:15
PM),
http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/world/53390704-68/military-protesters-mubarak-brotherhood.html.csp
(describing Egyptian military as having taken power upon Mubarak's ouster); Jonathan Eyal, Arab
Spring May End in Political Winter; Mid-East, North Africa Could Be Chaoticfor Years as Revolutions Stall, THE STRAITS TIMES (July 21, 2011), http://sun7stiqa.straitstimes.com/
World/Story/STIStory_250169.html (indicating that Tunisia's army refused to fire on protestors).
The role of the military as partial agent of the democratic transformation is described more fully in
Section Ill.B infra.
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I would continue, as I would certainly regard such a description as
appalling, but I need not, because I think it sufficiently obvious as not to
require further discussion.
Yet if the Arab Spring transformations are self-evidently not coups,
are they "revolutions"? Do they, that is, involve the type of massive legal
and constitutional structural changes that normally arise in a revolution,
achieved through extraconstitutional means? Here, the picture is more
mixed, mainly because it is difficult to know precisely how much formal
constitutional change there will in these states once the transformations
are complete. In Egypt, an elected legislature created a constitutional
assembly to draft a new permanent constitution, but that assembly was
promptly suspended by the judiciary.48 Later the military council disbanded the lower house of the legislature pursuant to a decision by the
Supreme Constitutional Court of Egypt ruling that its entire composition
was illegal. 4 9 The recently elected president, Mohammad Morsi, ordered
the lower house reinstated, this was challenged by the ruling military
council, which in turn has led to even more confusion and delay concerning the efforts to draft a new constitution.o
Given this, it is hard to know precisely what kind of state will
emerge in Egypt pending further developments. It is possible, however,
that the constitution will not look very different from that of the Mubarak
era. This may well be because the purpose of the protests was not so
much the creation of an entire new and transformational legal and political structure but rather the removal of a tyrant and the consequent realization of the democratic principles that already existed within the constitutional fabric that had been grievously abused by Mubarak. .
In Tunisia, the outcome is similarly uncertain, as elections for a
constitutional assembly were not held until the October of 2011." It is
not clear whether or not the changes to the constitution that the constitutional assembly since formed will undertake will likewise be conservative and limited in their scope, or more pervasive and transformational.

48.
Yasmine Saleb & Dina Zayed, Egyptian Court Blocks Creation of Constitutional Assembly, THE DAILY STAR (LEB.), Apr. 11, 2012.
49.
Nate Wright, Chaos and Fearin Cairo as Judges Shut Down FirstFree Parliament,THE
TIMES (LONDON), June 15, 2012, at 31.

50. Egypt Court Delays Ruling On Constitutional Addendum, Parliament Decree Until
17,
2012),
(July
ONLINE
AHRAM
Thursday,
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1 /64/47990/Egypt/ Politics-/Egypt-court-delays-ruling-onconstitutional-addend.aspx.
51.
See David D. Kirkpatrick, Tunisia Postpones Election, PossiblyAiding New Parties,N.Y.
TIMES, June 9, 2011, at Al 0; Paul Schemm, Tunisian Islamist Party Claims Election Victory, Set to
Dominate Writing of New Constitution, NEWSER (Oct. 24, 2011, 4:17 PM),
http://www.newser.com/article/d9qitbugO/tunisian-islamist-party-claims-election-victory-set-todominate-writing-of-new-constitution.html.
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Libya's elections were only held in the summer of 2012 and thus
the outcome in that state is in some ways even harder to predict. 5 2 Nevertheless, while the precise structure of the future state certainly remains
uncertain, it is hard to believe that whatever emerges will be anything but
entirely transformed in a fundamental fashion, given that Col. Qaddafi
has over the past several decades created a state structure that can only
be described as bizarre and therefore unlikely to survive. The three
states thus might offer three very different outcomes as concerns the substantive extent of formal legal and constitutional change undertaken.
What about process? Are these changes more reforms than revolutions? That is, is some sort of principle of legality being followed? In
Libya, surely extralegal means were necessary to effect the change, as
Qaddafi was deposed in war and no constitution existed to guide a subsequent electoral process. Legality is perhaps most closely adhered to in
Tunisia, where some respect for legal principles has applied. In December of 2010, President Ben Ali, the authoritarian ruler of Tunisia for decades, fled the country, and the prime minister indicated at first he would
assume control.54 The Constitutional Council indicated in January of
2011 that the post of president was vacant, but that in fact it would have
to be the vice president who assumed control pursuant to Article 57 of
the Tunisian Constitution, and not the prime minister.5 ' The vice president assumed that position on January 14, 201 1.56 The Court ruled that
elections would have to be organized within sixty days.57 On March 3,
2011, within the sixty day deadline, the election was scheduled for July
of that same year. 8 It was then delayed until October, and successfully
held then.5 9 The process of transformation thus appeared to at least arguably hold to principles of legality.

52. David D. Kirkpatrick, Libya: Monitors PraiseElection, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2012, at A8.
53. Libya, in theory, is not governed by any constitution save the Qur'an, though this does not
seem to mean anything, in that Qaddafi himself is hardly committed to any sort of recognizable
Islamic rule. NATHAN J. BROWN, CONSTITUTIONS IN A NONCONSTITUTIONAL WORLD: ARAB BASIC
LAWS AND THE PROSPECTS FOR ACCOUNTABLE GOVERNMENT 86 (2002). The balance of govern-

ance is supposed to be undertaken by popular, local committees and congresses through some form
of direct democracy. Id; see also The World Factbook: Libya, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ly.html (last updated Nov. 7,
2011). In theory, Qaddafi has not held an official position within the state since 1977; the state has
no national leader. Mohamad Bazzi, What Did Qaddafi'sGreen Book Really Say?, N.Y. TIMES, May
25, 2011, at BR27. It is hard to believe that any subsequent regime would seek to continue this
inanity.
54. Tunisia Swears in Interim Leader, AL JAZEERA (Jan. 16, 2011, 2:35 PM),
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/01/201111513513854222.html.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Tarek Amara, Tunisia Interim PresidentCallsJuly 24 Election, REUTERS (March 3, 2011,
6:16 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/03/us-tunisia-elections-idUSTRE7227IP2011
0303. .
59. Islamists to the Fore: Tunisia's General Election, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 29, 2011, at 57.
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Egypt straddles these two examples, in that the transformation process purports to be legal, with the active participation of courts, yet there
is cause for skepticism. The "constitution" under which Egypt is operating is no more than a series of provisional constitutional declarations
issued by the ruling military council. The major declaration issued was
effectively blessed by referendum in March of 2011 and in fact is little
more than a series of amendments to the Mubarak era constitution. 60 But
the military has unilaterally amended it at times, including an amendment in June of 2012, just before a presidential election, that appropriates
to the military council powers previously belonging to the president.
Perhaps from the perspective of process it would be best to describe
these changes then, at least in Tunisia and perhaps in Egypt, as
"refolutions" in motion, borrowing from the phrase made famous by
Timothy Garton Ash, among others, to describe the transformations in
Eastern Europe following the collapse of communism. 62 The line between reform and revolution is not always clear, as numerous scholars
have pointed out. JTnos Kis, for example, points to the traditional distinction in his work on the transformations that took place in Eastern Europe
and the difficulty of placing those transformations into one camp or the
other.6 ' Andrew Arato has focused on the same region and pointed to
some of the same confounding dilemmas.
In the end, however, perhaps none of this really matters. Perhaps
there is no purpose in getting lost in the thickets of taxonomy. If we are
to examine these events from the standpoint of their legitimacy as committed democrats, it may be well enough to describe them as "democratic
transformations." The touchstone for their legitimacy, that is, must be
neither the extent of the changes sought, nor the processes by which they
were obtained, but rather by the extent of popularsupport for them. That
is, even if Egypt, or Tunisia, end up with a constitution quite similar to
the one that previously existed, yet, importantly, not put to the same
grievous abuses, surely a fundamental transformation will have occurred-one worthy of the support of a committed democrat. Surely the
demand for a change of leadership is enough under these circumstances.
In March of 2011, a referendum was held whereby modest amendments to the existing
60.
Egyptian constitution were approved so that the document could serve as a provisional constitution.
Jason Petrucci, Egypt's Referendum, Reasonfor Guarded Optimism, DAILY NEWS EGYPT (Mar. 31,
2011, 5:35 PM), http://thedailynewsegypt.com/global-views/egypts-referendum-reason-for-guardedoptimism.html. These became the basis of the second "constitutional declaration." .
Abdul Rahman Hussein, Egyptians Protest Against New Powers for Military Council,
61.
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The important point is that these uprisings did not in any way resemble illegitimate military juntas seeking to impose their authority in
place of that of a deposed president or dictator; they were popular demands for massive and fundamental transformation. The mere fact that
the people of the Arab states were not necessarily seeking broad constitutional change so much as the political realization of democracy long
promised and never delivered hardly seems to be any sort of reason to
deprive their movements of the same normative power afforded to any
democratic revolution.
To illustrate why this is, one might well contrast the recent Arab
Spring uprisings with the transformative changes of an earlier era, and
specifically, Gamal Abdul Nasser's takeover of Egypt. That was, let us
be clear, engineered by a cadre of junior military officers (insiders), operating in secret, using the threat of military force, completing their operation within a period of days and motivated certainly by a desire for
power. This group of army officers created a Revolutionary Command
Council (RCC) which banned all political parties, vested all governmental authority in the RCC and then created a constitution which the dean
of Arab constitutionalism, Nathan Brown, has described as perfection in
"the art of writing anticonstitutionalist constitutions."6 6 In that case, there
was change of a radical nature that occurred. It heralded the end of a
monarchy and its replacement with a nondemocratic "republic" engineered and administered by a group of army officers who assumed all
governmental authority. It almost certainly led to more change than a
mass protest movement that paralyzed a nation and brought down a tyrant in order to institute the free and fair elections promised in the legal
system that already existed. Yet it was also a coup, hardly the inspiration
for democratic transformation. What the Nasser example demonstrates,
more than anything, is that in assessing the legitimacy of these transformations from a democratic standpoint, we need not look to the extent of
the legal and political change undertaken as a formal matter (meaning the
level of amendment to the existing legal and constitutional structure), nor
to its legality, but only to the extent to which the changes were truly the
product of popular demand.
B. Nondemocratic PoliticalTransformation
We might well look past process, or the extent of formal legal
change, but it is not enough for the committed democrat to look solely to
the level of the popular demand to assess the legitimacy of the transformation. The uncomfortable fact remains that not every transformation
demanded by a people is democratic in impulse and outlook. Some, in
fact, are very much the opposite. In such cases, it hardly behooves the
65.
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democrat to support the change or deem it somehow legitimate, though
of course it would be foolish and counterproductive to impose democracy under such circumstances, in the face of such broad popular opposition. To illustrate by way of example, I turn to a decidedly nondemocratic political transformation, indeed a revolution under almost any defimition, with which I am familiar as a scholar of modem Shi'ism-the Iranian Revolution of 1979.
That the Ayatollah Khomeini, the figure leading the Islamic Revolution, was not a liberal democrat was a fact perfectly obvious to anyone
paying attention. Long before the Iranian Revolution in the late 1970s,
the Ayatollah Khomeini had established an entire juristic career premised
on the principle of Islamic government under the aegis of a Supreme
Jurisprudent, the most knowledgeable of the clerics, who would administer that state, carrying the same political authority as that of the Prophet
Muhammad himself6 These ideas largely crystallized while Khomeini
was in exile in the 1960s in the seminaries of Najaf, in particular in the
publication of a well-known pamphlet entitled "Islamic Government"
that was based on a series of lectures offered in Najaf in 1970.68 Highly
influential, and often translated as "Guardianship of the Jurist,"69 Khomeini lays out in the pamphlet in ample detail precisely the manner in
which the government is to be managed, administered, and run by the
leader of the clerical classes.70 On the matter of the people drafting their
own legislation to determine their future, he had this to say:
[I]f laws are needed, Islam has established them all. There is no need
for you, after establishing a government, to sit down and draw up
laws. ... Everything is ready and waiting. All that remains is to draw
up ministerial programs, and that can be accomplished with the help
and cooperation of consultants and advisers who are experts in different fields, gathered together in a consultative assembly. 7 '
The true source of authority, however, does not lie with such tech-

nocrats. Thus, Khomeini indicated:
But as for the supervision and supreme administration of the country,
the dispensing of justice and the establishment of equitable relations
among the people-these are precisely the subjects the faqih has
studied. Whatever is needed to preserve national independence and
67.
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liberty is, again, precisely what the faqih has to offer. For it is the
faqih who refuses to submit to others or fall under the influence of
foreigners, and who defends the rights of the nation and the freedom,
independence and territorial integrity of the Islamic homeland .... 72
Elsewhere, in the event this was insufficiently clear, Khomeini indicated:
The judicial and governmental functions assigned . . . to the fuqaha

[plural offaqih] are retained permanently.73
The point is repeated for its emphasis later:
The 'ulama [scholars] of Islam have been appointed . . . to the posi-

tion of ruler and judge, and these positions belong to them in perpetuity.74
Khomeini not only failed to dissemble respecting these matters, he
considered it a higher calling to disseminate his ideas. Concerning the
Islamic government, led by the jurist as described above, he had this to
say in his highly influential 1970 pamphlet: "It is our duty to work toward the establishment of Islamic government. The first activity we must
undertake in this respect is the propagation of our cause; that is how we
must begin."7 1
Taking up his own challenge, Khomeini continued to advance these
ideas from exile throughout the 1970s with such ferocity and vigor that
he managed to alienate much of the Najaf senior establishment, among
them the Quietist Abol Qasim al-Khu'i, and even the Grand Ayatollah of
his day, the formidable Sayyid Muhsin Al-Hakim.7 6 Because of his ideas,
he was passed over for the position of Supreme Jurisprudent in Najaf
after Hakim's death in favor of Khu'i, who did not advocate clerical engagement in politics, rendering Khomeini something of an outlier within
Najaf itself.77
In response, Khomeini turned against Najaf for its political apathy
concerning Iran, going so far as to dismiss its clerics as "sound asleep" in
one remarkable declaration, issued in 1971,78 and "dead and buried"79 in
another. Yet despite senior jurist apathy within Iraq, Khomeini's ideas
respecting Islamic government had been percolating among rising schol72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
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ars such as Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr.80 In particular, they inspired Sadr
to develop more precise guidelines, and add more intellectual heft, respecting the future Islamic state and the means by which the Supreme
Jurist would be determined. 8'
Underlying all of these ideas from Khomeini was a hatred and contempt for the West that was given frequent voice. In t964, upon the
Shah's granting of immunity from Iranian prosecution to soldiers of the
United States, Khomeini accused the government of "reduc[ing] the Iranian people to a level lower than that of an American dog." 82 Later in the
same speech he described the United States, the United Kingdom, and
the Soviet Union each as more "unclean" than the other." In his 1970
pamphlet, he described the United States and the United Kingdom as
imperialists and indicated that faqih rule is necessary because it is the
"faqihwho refuse[d] to submit to others or fall under the influence of
foreigners" and "who does not deviate either to the left or to the right,"
thinly veiled references to the Soviet Union and the United States, respectively. 84 In 1972, in a message to Muslim students in North America,
he indicated that "[i]mperialism of the left and of the right have joined
hands in their efforts to annihilate the Muslim peoples."85 In February of
1978, nearly a year before the Shah's departure, he described the British,
the Soviet Union, and the United States as bringing misfortune upon Iran
in its modem history and described the Carter Administration in particular as employing the "logic of bandits."" The consistency and stridency
of the rhetoric over two decades of speeches and writings is remarkable.
All of this, both the program for Islamic government and its stridently anti-imperialist, regional liberation emphasis, was a matter of so
much debate, and so much intellectual ferment, that it is very difficult to
take seriously any claim that Khomeini had somehow claimed any interest in a democratic transformation in his society, as opposed to an Islamizing one. Until his return to Iran, Khomeini never suggested any deviation from his long established view that the state had to be Islamic and
the people would not be consulted on the point in any real way.t8 Several
80. See Haider Ala Hamoudi, You Say You Want a Revolution: Interpretive Communities and
the Origins ofIslamic Finance,48 VA. J. INT'L L. 249, 272-73 (2008).
81.

CHIBLI MALLAT, THE RENEWAL OF ISLAMIC LAW: MUHAMMAD BAQER AS-SADR, NAJAF

AND THE SHI'I INTERNATIONAL 70 (1993). It would thus be fair to say that the structuraldetails of
the state that Khomeini envisioned was not laid out until Sadr's work. Id. Of the essential principle,
however, that the jurists would act as rulers and judges, there could be no doubt, Khomeini had, as
the main text shows, spent his entire life advancing, and indeed proselytizing, the notion of juristic
rule wherein the Supreme Jurisprudent would occupy a political leadership role akin to that of the
Prophet Muhammad.

82.
KHOMEINI, supra note 68, at 182.
83.
Id. at 185.
84. Id. at 137.
85. Id at 210.
86. Id. at 221, 224.
87. See SHAUL BAKHASH, THE REIGN OF THE AYATOLLAHS: IRAN AND THE ISLAMIC
REVOLUTION 72 (1984). At most, Khomeini was prepared to concede a referendum, but solely for
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months before his arrival in Iran, and completely consistent with his extensive work over the previous several decades, he described the revolution as "one hundred percent Islamic" and its leadership as "belong[ing]
to the clerical community."88
Were Khomeini a minor figure in the 1979 Revolution who had
managed to take control by some fortuitous circumstance, it might be
maintained that somehow the revolution was democratic if Khomeini
himself was not. Yet this was not the case, Khomeini was the undisputed
face and voice of the revolution. Thus, he was given authority within
days of his return to appoint an executive government.89 Given all of this,
if anyone in Iran in the late 1970s agitating in favor of Khomeini's return
to lead the state was duped into believing Khomeini was a liberal democrat or could possibly find liberal democracy acceptable, they had managed to dupe themselves. Assuming the bulk of the Iranian people leading the revolution to be reasonably aware of Khomeini's consistent positions over the course of decades, the only conclusion is that this transformation designed to hand him executive control was indeed a revolution, but it was by no means democratic, in spirit or intent, even if some,
even some within Iran, may well have wished it so.
As Khomeini's designs and his positions, were well known to anyone who bothered to pay the slightest attention to his writings, his
speeches, and his juristic career, it is no surprise that he began to implement them immediately. The creation of the Islamic state that had been
long discussed among activists began to take shape, precisely in the form
he, along with Sadr and others, had originally presented as a "blueprint"
in their extensive work on the subject. 90
The temptation to accept the theory of duplicity on the part of the
Khomeini-that he promised a people's choice and a democracy in the
sense we understand it and then failed to deliver on it-would be strong
among those committed to democratic governance. But the lesson might
be that we must come more fully to terms with a core, uncomfortable
truth. Not every people is particularly interested at any given time in
liberation through self-rule and that various ideological mirages, from
Marxism to these rather extreme manifestations of political Islam involving juristic supervision of government and judiciary have their influence
and their sway at times.9 1 Any attempt to make some sense of the democratic revolution, and indeed to restore it to the exalted normative place
the purpose of confirming that the people had chosen an Islamic state, not as a means of offering a
free choice. Id. Khomeini's position was that the "referendum" had already taken place in the form
of the popular uprising against the Shah. Id
88. Id. at 48.
89. BAKHASH, supra note 87, at 51.
90. MALLAT, supranote 81, at 6.
91.
As the earlier references to the Green Revolution make clear, I would certainly not characterize Iran's more recent convulsions as being anything but fundamentally democratic in impulse.
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to which it belongs, requires us to acknowledge this, and to admit that
where our normative values are not shared, they will not be realized.
III. REMOVING THE FORMALIST BARRIERS

A. The Typology of the Transformation
Let us then take the strands outlined above and attempt to combine
them into a more cohesive set of ideas concerning the democratic revolution cum coup cum radical reform, all of which I shall bundle into the
single word "transformation," denoting as it does substantive political
change of the more fundamental sort, to be distinguished from incremental and ordinary lawmaking. The first strand, again, is to free ourselves
from the shackles of taxonomy. That is, the precise typology of the transformation is of little moment for our purposes, whether it be premised on
legal continuity (as in East Europe's various velvet revolutions), focused
primarily on the removal of a corrupt and tyrannical political leadership
with little formal legal change (as may yet occur in some states of the
Arab Spring), or involving an entire break with legality and the existing
political and legal regime (as in the American, French, and Romanian
Revolutions, and as is sure to occur in Libya).
To be absolutely clear, I mean this not as generalized criticism of
the valuable and important work that has been done in categorization in
this area, but rather only that, to the extent that the project involves the
restoration of the democratic revolution as normative commitment,
something too much can be made of typology. Once such typologies are
abandoned, the second, related strand is to look to the substance of the
transformation and the extent to which it might be characterized as one
that is committed to the establishment of continued popular rule as its
core normative commitment, rather than the use of the people and evident popular demands as instrument to the creation of another form of
government, be it Marxist, nondemocratic Islamist, or anything else.
Viewed through such a lens, there was little that was democratic
about the 1979 Iranian Revolution, in both conception and execution,
even as the more recent Green Revolution in Iran was fundamentally
democratic. 92 There was absolutely nothing democratic about Nasser's
Free Officer Coup in Egypt in 1952, involving as it did the repeal of a
democratic constitution and the subsequent banning of all political parties in Egypt, signaling what one prominent Egyptian commentator has
I do not mean by this that there were no liberal democratic groups that might have partici92.
pated in the 1979 Revolution, hoping that despite Khomeini's well established position respecting
Islamic rule, some space might exist for them to project their own vision onto the state more successfully than Khomeini might project his. It would be silly to reduce all revolutionaries to any single
rigid archetype in any revolutionary transformation. The point is that the general thrust of the Iranian Revolution, and most importantly the figure who led it, was the establishment of juristic, not
popular, rule.
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described as the end of democracy in Egypt. 93 The same could not be
said respecting the massive, popular uprisings that led to the transformations in Eastern Europe, the "refolutions" that generally, with the exception of Romania, adhered to strict processes of legality.
Similarly, and most relevant for the purposes of this Article, the
transformations of the Arab Spring are unambiguously grounded in assumptions of popular sovereignty. Some of these states, as with Libya,
will, assuming they can manage their transformations despite significant
obstacles,94 lead to fundamental transformations of state structure in a
manner that surely will involve a break with legality. It is hard to understand how Qaddafi's bewildering Jamahariyyastructure95 is supposed to
function, let alone precisely how one would amend it to adhere to principles of legality. With others, such as Tunisia, the matter is far less certain. Constitutional amendment, perhaps far reaching, perhaps profound,
but nonetheless legal (meaning in conformity with existing rules of
amendment as laid out in the current constitution) might be a potential
promising means to achieve necessary change.
Naturally all such changes would need to be evaluated on a continuing basis to ensure that they were democratic. The road to democratic
rule in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya alike is fraught with peril. By privileging substance over form, a sensible temporal reexamination of this sort is
more possible than when attempting to formally describe a particular
change as a "revolution," "reform," or a "coup."
Yet, the more important result of liberating the democratic transformation from the shackles of form is that this permits the conception of
the democratic transformation to be restored to the exalted and romantic
place to which a committed democrat would like to place it. Adherence
to the form of the change simply will not serve to achieve this. It is impossible to imagine that one finds a group of people who bravely take to
the streets, as in Syria, under a hail of live ammunition to demand the
people's right to rule themselves, dying in significant numbers on a daily
basis as a result, any less inspiring if they manage to achieve their aims
with the belated acquiescence of the existing regime through a series of
far reaching legislative and constitutional changes negotiated in an East
European style "round table."96 The brave men and women of Tahrir
93. Ahmed Othman, The Revolution ofJuly 23 and the End ofDemocracy in Egypt, ASHARQ
ALAWSAT, July 23, 2011, at 20.
94. Rami Al-Shaheibi, Libyan Defense Minister Seeks Deal in Seized Town, ARAB NEWS
(Jan. 25, 2012), http://arabnews.com/middleeast/article56801 .ece (quoting U.N. Envoy for Libya
Ian Martin that "weak, at times absent, state institutions, coupled with the long absence of political
parties and civil society organizations ... render the country's transition more difficult").
BROWN, supra note 53, at 86 (describing a confounding organization involving myriad
95.
committees and congresses acting in theory through some form of direct democracy at local levels).
96.

See Jon Elster, Introduction, in THE ROUNDTABLE TALKS AND THE BREAKDOWN OF

COMMUNISM 1, 3 (Jon Elster ed., 1996) (describing the round table process in the states of the former Soviet bloc).
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Square are no less entitled to the sacred space of the democratic revolution than those of Libya even if the change they manage to achieve adheres to processes of legality or involves in the end less formal change to
the legal structure.
This is largely because legality has nothing to do with the nobility
of the protesters, but rather is decided more by the tyrant, or at least the
institutions of authority. An Eastern European communist regime wise
enough to see that its time has come to an end which seeks maximum
near term influence through round table negotiations will be able to
avoid the messiness of "nonconstitutional" change through earnest bargaining, while an unrepentant and bloody tyrant such as Romania's
Ceaugescu leaves his people no choice but the means of non-legality.
The process mechanisms effectively dictated by the autocrats who control the means of violence should hardly impinge upon our core romantic
and normative commitment to the democratic protesters themselves. The
romantic conception in the end is of a people who seek change of the
fundamental, transformationalsort, whose end is the creation or restoration of a state that is ruled by its people and whose people constitute the
legitimacy for its existence. The means by which this is achieved are
largely irrelevant.
B. TransformationandAgency
The typology of the revolution is related to, if distinct from, another
formal distinction from which we need to free ourselves: the agency of
the democratic transformation. Let us begin with a rather salutary example where democratic transformation was not initiated by the peoplethat of post-Franco Spain.98 Commentators frequently discuss the rather
remarkable manner in which democratic change was brought about in
Spain through the enactment of a Fundamental Law, thereby adopting
Franco's authoritarian lawmaking model to ensure careful adherence to
principles of legality in the democratization process. 99
But there is another fascinating aspect of Spain's democratic transformation that is worth exploring. It was administered by a monarch
whom Franco had trusted would ensure authoritarian continuity.100 A
king vested with absolute authority, that is to say, seems as capable as
the people for bringing about democratic transformations under the proper conditions. Naturally, and as discussed earlier in this Article, neither a
See Ruth Jackson Lee, The Stepchildren of the EU: Bulgaria and Romania, 16 J.
97.
TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 361, 370 (2007).
ANDREA BONIME-BLANC, SPAIN'S TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY:
98.
CONSTITUTION-MAKING 9 (1987).

THE POLITICS OF

Id. at 24.
99.
Id. at 18 (describing earlier attempts at democratic reform undertaken by Franco and the
100.
first post-Franco prime minister as "feeble" and indicating that democratization did not begin in
earnest until the King chose to embark upon that course).
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democratically minded monarch nor a foreign power can bring democratization to (or impose democratization upon) a people uninterested in it.
There is no doubt that pressures for democratic reform had been building
in Spain when the king embarked upon the course he did.'0o Yet without
the king, the success of the democratic transformation was by no means
assured. The king was, without serious question, the agent for the transformation even if the transformation required conditions other than the
king's good intentions to sustain itself.
In stark contrast, despite repeated calls for political reform over the
course of years, and despite repeated promises to undertake such reforms, the rulers threatened by the Arab Spring generally took precisely
the reverse course, stalling any changes in favor of democratization until
the promises of such reforms could no longer be taken seriously by any
reasonable person.1 0 2 Those transformations were initiated instead by
101.
Id. at 22-23.
102.
To take the simplest example, in the middle of the last decade, President Hosni Mubarak
of Egypt promised a series of wide-ranging and much touted democratic reforms that were supposed
to permit, among other things, true competition in presidential elections. Megan K. Stack & Sonni
Efron, Presidentof Egypt Calls for Open Election, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2005, at Al. The subsequent elections turned out to be anything but fair and free-there were widespread voting irregularities reported, and a leading opposition candidate, liberal activist Ayman Nour, was in jail during the
election. Editorial, Not Fair,Not Free, BALT. SUN, Dec. 13, 2005, at 18A. Moreover, at the same
time that these supposedly democratic reforms were set to take place, President Mubarak was
grooming his son to take his place. Daniel Williams, Egyptians Wonder ifDynasty Is Near; Mubarak's Son Gaining Prominence, WASH. POST, Sept. 24, 2004, at Al4. This sort of warped dynastic
succession masquerading as republicanism took place in Syria as well, where Bashar al-Asad had
replaced his father in 2000. As with Mubarak, Bashar has long promised reforms that have yet to be
delivered. Fouad Ajami, Your Silence Is Killing Us; As a People Rise in Revolt, a Son Emulates the
Cruelty of His Father, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 15, 2011, at 0. Libya had taken a similar course with Seif
al-Islam el-Qaddafi, the son of Colonel Muammar el-Qaddafi, setting himself up to replace his father
and promising, as did Bashar al-Asad, to undertake political and economic reform. Landon Thomas
Jr., Unknotting Father'sReins in Hope of 'Reinventing' Libya, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2010, at All.
Given the rather disconcerting Arab pattern, the surprise lies not so much in the promise but in the
credulous Western media and government attention Seif seemed to gamer for his reform charade. Id.
(describing Seif as trying to "dismantle" the authoritarian and socialist structure his father had created, indicating he had a "bold independent streak" and suggesting there was "evidence of popular
support" for Seif domestically); see also Anton La Guardia, Gaddafi's Son Wanted as Torture
Watchdog, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH, Jan. 26, 2006, at 19 (describing Seif as "the most prominent
voice for political reform in Libya"). Incredibly, the United Kingdom even apparently wanted him to
act as some sort of independent "watchdog" to ensure that anyone deported from the U.K. to Libya
was not tortured. Id. Leaving aside the preposterous notion that a son could under any circumstances
be considered an independent "watchdog" over the activities of his father's regime, left hardly discussed by reputable sources was the possibility that Seif was grandstanding to receive international
attention and hardly interested in anything other than the accumulation of power, precisely as Bashar
and Gamal were in similarly situated regimes. In any event, the good intentions of this supposed
political reformer with the bold independent streak have been forced to light by popular demands to
end the political system that he was supposedly working so hard to "dismantle." Rather than joining
their cause, he hitched his wagon to his father's and described the regime opponents as "rats."
InomineX, Libya: 31 August 2011, Saif al-Islam Gadhafi Speech, English Summary, YOUTUBE
(Aug. 31, 2011), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v-gRPsrYxtXA&feature-related. He has been
indicted by the International Criminal Court for crimes against humanity in connection with the
repression of protesters, which included the use of live fire ammunition to disperse crowds and the
deployment of snipers to fire on those leaving mosques after the Friday prayers. Zach Zagger, ICC
Issues Arrest Warrantsfor Libya Leader Gaddafi, His Son, Head of Intelligence, JURIST (June 27,
2011, 8:43 AM), http://jurist.org/paperchase/2011/06/icc-issues-arrest-warrants-for-libya-leader-
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inspiring masses of ordinary people courageously demanding the creation of regimes of popular sovereignty as described earlier.103 Yet, the
role of other institutions cannot be gainsaid. In particular, the army
proved to be a decisive agent of the democratic transformations throughout the Arab Spring. Where the army hitched itself to the fate of the regime, as in Syria, Yemen, and Bahrain, the outcome has been far less
certain, or dramatically unsuccessful."' Where the army has declined the
invitation to kill its own people, as in Egypt and Tunisia, the ouster of the
sitting ruler was swift. 0 5 In Egypt, in fact, the military's role is significant enough, particularly in transition, that it might well be considered in
something of a (tense, perilous but nonetheless real) partnership with the
Egyptian people in managing the transformation.' 6 Both the people and
the army are thus equal agents in engineering the fate of the transformation in these states. 0 7
Thus, just as distinctions between "coup," "reform," and "revolution" are less than helpful in describing and resurrecting the romantic
appeal and normative power of democratic transformations, so is a relentless focus on the people as being the exclusive agent of such transformation. Naturally, the existence of popular support and legitimacy for
any transformation is fundamentally important, whether it be registered
at the moment of change or years later, at first election. A democratic
transformation in which the people are not invested and where the people
seek something else entirely is hardly self-sustaining. Yet the precise role
of the popular will in achieving the change, relative to other institutions
or influences, might well be overstated. The revolution, that is to say,
should require the people's support to earn the sacred space. When that
support is precisely manifested, however, is of less importance.

gaddafi,-his-son-head-of-intelligence.php. A less fitting candidate for human rights "watchdog" can
scarcely be imagined.
See discussion supraPart L
103.
Borzou Daragahi, Other Regimes Emboldened by Gadhafi'sBrutal Tactics; Arab Leaders
104.
in Yemen and Elsewhere Follow His Lead in Using Extreme Force to Stay in Power, CHI. TRIB.,
Mar. 20, 2011, at C20.
Eyal, supra note 47 ("Former Tunisian president Zine El Abidine Ben Ali fled only when
105.
his soldiers were no longer prepared to fire on demonstrators; Egypt's Mr[.] Mubarak left under
similar circumstances.").
The words of Egypt's notorious star novelist Alaa Al Aswany, author of the best-selling
106.
The Yacoubian Building, perhaps best described this uneasy but real relationship as between people
and military. In an interview with Thomas Friedman, Al Aswany indicated "[w]e have had a revolution here that succeeded-but is not in power. So the goals of the revolution are being applied by an
agent, the army, which I think is sincere in wanting to do the right things, but it is not by nature
revolutionary." Thomas Friedman, Pay Attention, N.Y.TIMES, May 29, 2011, at WK8.
. It is commonly reported that very serious questions have arisen recently respecting the
107.
democratic commitments of the military rulers of Egypt, as they begin to repress protestors and
protect their own economic and political interests. See, e.g., Chibli Mallat, Saving the Egyptian
Revolution from the Military, JURIST (Dec. 27, 2011), http://jurist.org/forum/2011/12/chibli-mallategypt-military.php. This is indeed troubling, yet it only demonstrates the central role that the military
has played and is playing in managing the democratic revolution. If the military turns enemy of the
revolution, that is, the democratic future of Egypt is far more precarious.
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C. The Externally Imposed Democratic Transformation
Seen in this light, the externally imposed democratic transformation
is little more than locating the agency for democratic transformation at
least in part in a force that is neither a domestic monarch (as in Spain)
nor a domestic military (as in Tunisia and Egypt) but something external
to the nation-state altogether. In some cases, such agency might even
precede popular convulsions in favor of democratic rule because of the
effective machinery of repression organized by the state. I was in Iraq
during its first truly democratic elections, at the start of 2005.08 I remember the manner in which men, women, and children took to the
streets before sunrise, the cities silent because of the security ban on
driving vehicles, each with a grim sense of determination and purpose on
their way to voting booths in many cases miles away, braving suicide
bombers, terrorist threats to observe a boycott, and extremist promises of
future retaliation against any who dared to show up to vote. 109 I was there
as late morning turned to afternoon, and the streets began to erupt in joyous celebration, with hordes of young people waving their purple fingers
(stained by ink after voting, to prevent voter fraud) at any camera they
could find, determined to show their lack of fear at those who sought to
intimidate them against voting. Each was dressed in his finest wear, as if
no more important occasion than this could be imagined. If this did not
meet whatever standard we seek to establish in order to restore democratic transformation as romantic commitment, then quite frankly nothing
does.
It would be wrong to say that these people brought about the democratic transformation in their state. It would be equally wrong to say that
they did not want it. There was nothing devoid of popular legitimacy in
this set of events, irrespective of the fact that they were brought about
initially by the United States. In fact, even to describe the democratization process as being solely externally imposed prior to that election
108.
At that time, I served as a Project Manager for a legal education reform project that was
managed by the International Human Rights Law Institute of DePaul University. I was specifically
charged with introducing experiential forms of education into the Iraqi law school curriculum. Other
aspects of the project included library enhancement and other forms of curricular reform. The entire
project was managed by Sermid Al-Sarraf in Baghdad and led from Chicago by David Guinn and
Cherif Bassiouni.
109.
HAIDER ALA HAMOUDI, HOWLING IN MESOPOTAMIA: AN IRAQI-AMERICAN MEMOIR
248-49 (2008) [hereinafter HAMOUDI, HOWLING IN MESOPOTAMIA]. To be sure, there were limitations respecting the overall success of the democratic experiment in Iraq in 2005 owing largely to the
fact that the Sunni population had largely respected the electoral boycott, either out of fear or conviction, thereby exacerbating existing sectarian divisions. Id. at 249. This boycott was never repeated, however, and Iraqis currently vote in large numbers irrespective of sect or ethnicity. Haider Ala
Hamoudi, Identitarian Violence and Identitarian Politics: Elections and Governance in Iraq, 51
HARV. INT'L L.J. ONLINE 78, 94 (2010) [hereinafter Hamoudi, Identitarian Violence],
http://www.harvardilj.org/online. In any event, the point here is not that the initial election was an
untrammeled success but that it was democratic and successful enough (particularly when viewed in
conjunction -with subsequent elections in Iraq which are deeply democratic) to act as inspiration for
democratic transformation.
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would be a mistake. The greatest proponent for near-term elections after
the American invasion was not the United States, which counseled delay
repeatedly, but rather the high Shi'i cleric Ali Sistani, who demanded
elections as early as June of 2003, less than two months after Saddam's
statue had been brought down in Firdous Square in central Baghdad.no
Agency for democratic transformation, that is to say, in Iraq was divided
among three different entities. The first was the United States, whose
removal of an unspeakable tyrant made it possible for domestic elites to
voice their demands without being summarily executed."' The second
were domestic elites themselves, who demanded early elections and
similarly sought that they be held on schedule and without delay.1 2 And
the third, of course, were the Iraqi people, who have in repeated electoral
events voted in overwhelming numbers irrespective of ethnicity, religion,
or sectarian group.
In other words, a focus on both the typology and agency of democratic transformation might be distracting us from what should be the
core undertaking, which is to evaluate the transformation through its
commitment to and realization of popular democratic rule. It may in the
end be no more important that the transformation be characterized as
"reform" or "revolution" than it is that it be led in the first instance by
the people, the army, a monarch, a foreign power, or (more likely) some
rather complex combination of the foregoing. The point is not that a
democratic transformation can be possible without public supportclearly it cannot be. The point, rather, is that an additional agent is often
required, at times to instigate the reform, at other times to support it, and
the nationality of that agent hardly need concern the committed democrat.
Thus, internal transformations that do not lead to the creation of
popular democratic rule, even those that might enjoy popular legitimacy
in their time (such as Khomeini's Iran) are hardly inspirations for those
of us passionately, normatively, and romantically committed to a conception of democratic transformation. Those that do lead to democratic
transformation, even if brought about in the first instance by a wellintentioned king rather than the people, as in Spain, may be extolled.
Similarly, external regime transformations often, indeed almost always,
110.
Hamoudi, Identitarian Violence, supra note 109, at 85.
111.
For more details respecting the manner in which the Saddam regime managed to silence
the clerical elite wherever and whenever they sought political change of any sort, see id.
This included not only Sistani and the clerical elite, but the existing interim Iraqi govern112.
ment as well as the Kurdish political leadership. See Au A. ALLAWi, THE OCCUPATION OF IRAQ:
WINNING THE WAR, LOSING THE PEACE 344-46 (2007). Again, there was initial Sunni disaffection

from the state and a resulting opposition to elections, a matter that in other contexts I have emphasized as having been particularly problematic. Hamoudi, Identitarian Violence, supra note 109, at
93-94; see also HAMOUDI, HOWLING IN MESOPOTAMIA, supra note 109, at 248-49. Yet for our

purposes it suffices to say that the Iraqi people currently embrace democratic governance with fervor, and they have been instrumental in ensuring its qualified success to date. Of this there can be
little doubt.
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do not lead to the establishment of popular democratic rule, and are as
such justifiably enough castigated. These would include the attempted
destruction of a state and its incorporation into the invading state, as in
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990113 and the establishment of client states
largely dependent on host state support to survive, as in former Soviet
controlled15Eastern Europel14 or Lebanon during the period of Syrian occupation."
Yet, at times the external intervention does lead to the creation of
popular democratic regimes, in a manner that we later almost uniformly
regard as salutary and that as a result ought to require us to reevaluate
whether or not our commitment to the sovereignty of tyrants is as deep as
we actually say it is. Perhaps the example par excellence of unabashed
democratic imposition over elite domestic objection lies in the example
of Japan. Following the conquest of Japan at the end of World War II,
the United States undertook a military occupation of the country and
sought a rather thorough transformation of its regime from that which
was authoritarian to something far more democratic."' 6 The extent and
necessity of constitutional changes to bring this about proved to be
among the most contentious disputes between the United States and Japanese -legal elites.117
The Japanese, for their part, had created a committee known as the
Matsumoto Committee.' Its initial purpose was to engage in a constitutional study; however, it quickly proposed a constitution that attempted
to adhere as closely as possible to the principles of the existing Meiji
Constitution." 9 One would assume that international law would then
impose upon the United States duties as occupier to accept such a revision, as the Hague Convention requires a state to uphold laws in force
"unless absolutely prevented," 20 and the Matsumoto Committee, Japanese in origin and inception, was making a concerted effort to uphold
existing Japanese law.

113.
114.

ALLAWI, supra note 112, at 43.

JUAN J. LINz & ALFRED STEPAN, PROBLEMS OF DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION AND
CONSOLIDATION: SOUTHERN EUROPE, SOUTH AMERICA, AND POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE 236-38

(1996).
115.
Upon the conclusion of the Ta'if accords in 1990 and the conclusion of the Lebanese Civil
War, Syria became the dominant power within Lebanese politics, given the equivalent of a mandate
to control its affairs. FAWWAZ TRABOULSI, A HISTORY OF MODERN LEBANON 245-46 (2007). That

only ended with the assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri and the subsequent Cedar
Revolution. MICHAEL YOUNG, THE GHOSTS OF MARTYRS SQUARE: AN EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT OF

LEBANON'S LIFE STRUGGLE 54, 57 (2010) (referring to the Cedar Revolution as the "Independence
Intifada").
116.

See MOORE & ROBINSON, supranote 21, at v-vi.

117.
118.
119.
120.

Seeid.at23.
Id.at73-74.
See id. at 74-75.
Hague Convention IV, supranote 20, at art. 43.
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Yet this was not to be. MacArthur had earlier told Prime Minister
Konoe that the Meiji Constitution required significant revision to be sufficiently democratic.121 Faced with an existing constitution in a separate
sovereign nation-state, MacArthur elected to impose his vision. The
Matsumoto proposal was summarily rejected, described in a meeting
with the Japanese representatives as "wholly unacceptable" to MacArthur.12 2 An alternative was completed on MacArthur's orders in six days,
by a group of twenty-one Americans which, as a cover memorandum to
MacArthur proudly explained, included "nearly every form of American
political thought."l 23 It was offered with an ultimatum-either the document itself would be presented as the proposal of the Japanese government, or the government would not survive politically, as it would lose
the support of MacArthur himself.124 This document became the template
of the ultimate constitution enacted in Japan about a year later, a constitution that remains in force and is the foundational document of its liber-

al democracy.125
Those of us committed to democratic transformation, however
achieved, find little difficultly with all that transpired. The imposition,
after all, was upon the Matsumoto Committee, which was entitled to no
presumption of popular legitimacy, and MacArthur's express purpose
was to ensure greater democratic transformation. 126 The revised constitution has achieved that purpose to admirable effect over the past several
decades, ruling over a nation that, notwithstanding its current economic
problems, rose from near total destruction to becoming the second largest
economy in the world with dizzying speed.127 There is very little to regret
in this story.
By contrast, those who castigate the externally imposed democratic
transformation as per se illegitimate and a violation of the sovereignty of
another state will no doubt have a harder time explaining why it is that
the United States was entitled to act as it did. The rather happy story of
the evolution of Japan and Germany from fascist nightmares to democratic, stable nations stands in stark contrast, after all, to the principle
that interference in the internal affairs of other states constitutes an infringement on their sovereignty, a core violation of the United Nations
Charter 28 if nothing else. Yet, would anyone actually think it was the
See MOORE & ROBINSON, supra note 21, at 51.
121.
122. Id. at 108.
123. Id. at 106 (emphasis added).
124. See id. at 111.
125. See id. at 110, 329.
126. See id. at 51.
127. See Michael A. Panton, Politics, Practiceand Pacifism: Revising Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, 11 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL'Y J. 163, 197-98 (2008).
128.
U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 ("All Members shall refrain in their international relations
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state,
or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.").
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duty of the Allied powers to permit the continued existence of Nazi
Germany rather than impose democratic rule? If not, then precisely how
does one less apologetic than I am about the promise of imposed democracy expansion over the desires of repressive domestic forces go about
defending the World War II examples while demanding greater respect
be given to sovereignty for Iraq under Saddam Hussein in light of his
attempted genocide of two separate indigenous populations?1 29
The explanation most often begins with Reisman's wise insight that
while making regime change "generally lawful" would render international law into a nullity, regime change as a "contextually appropriate
instrument of an intrinsically lawful action" is another matter.' 3 0 Thus, to
extend Reisman's analysis, Japan and Germany had engaged in such
broad, unconscionable violations of international law, from expansionism to genocide, that to leave the regimes in place, even after the community of nations had forced their abatement, would only invite further
international instability, and the replacement of the regimes was the only
alternative, the "contextually appropriate instrument" to address the violations that had transpired.
While it is perfectly obvious that no system of international law
could sustain itself if it became generally acceptable for one state to
obliterate another for any reason it saw fit, this justification for regime
change seemh rather unconvincing and incomplete, at least when viewed
through a contemporary lens. Could it really be said that preventing the
Japanese government from enacting its own constitution was the "contextually appropriate" course in light of Japan's earlier, nearly unconditional surrender at Potsdam,"' its seemingly sincere belief that the Meiji
constitution was sufficiently democratic,1 32 and the requirement of the
Hague Convention to apply laws in force in a territory under occupation? 33 If the action was still justified because of the danger that Japan
had only a few years earlier posed to its neighbors, then under what principle could it not have been "contextually appropriate" to force a democratic constitution upon Iraq, a totalitarian state that had invaded its
neighbors twice and had to be forcibly removed each time? 34 It is true
that a sanctions regime imposed in Iraq since 1991 had effectively cripSaddam's brutality as against his own people is well documented, but involves among
129.
other things the organized killing of hundreds of thousands of Kurds in the latter part of the 1980s
and similar number of Shi'a in 1991, the latter undertaken by tanks adorned with the painted slogan
"[n]o Shi'is [will survive] after today." MARION FAROUK-SLUGLETT & PETER SLUGLETr, IRAQ
SINCE 1958: FROM REVOLUTION TO DICTATORSHIP 269-70,289 (2001).
130.
Reisman, supranote 8, at 89 (emphasis in original).
131.
See MOORE & ROBINSON, supra note 21, at 30.
132.
See id.at 51.
Hague Convention IV, supranote 20, at art. 43.
133.
134.
Iraq was largely responsible for starting hostilities with Iran in 1980 through a series of air
raids, the impetus being a desire by Saddam Hussein to be the undisputed power broker within the
Persian Gulf region. See FAROUK-SLUGLETr & SLUGLETT, supra note 129, at 256-57. It moreover
invaded Kuwait in August of 1990 and claimed it as its own province. Id. at 279.
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pled its army and prevented it from being a significant threat, but does
the catastrophic effect that sanctions have upon a civilian population,35
truly make it the more "contextually appropriate" instrument to deal with
Iraq? If so, why would the same not be true for 1945 Japan? The difficulty is thus apparent. Context can slip all too easily into pretext given the
lack of any sort of guiding standards to understand when regime change
might be acceptable as part of an "intrinsically lawful action" (whether it
be war against Iraq or Japan) and when it might not.
Moreover, an approach that permits regime change as part of lawful
action says little about the nature of the resulting regime. In other words,
regime change as concerns Nazi Germany, the theory might run, was
warranted in light of the unprecedented atrocities it had committed and
the foreign invasions in which it had engaged. Yet, on what basis, other
than an impassioned and unapologetic commitment to democratic rule,
could the resulting, emerging, democratic state of West Germany, imposed by France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, be considered normatively superior to the Soviet satellite state of East Germany,
imposed by the Soviet Union?1 3 6
Again, the passionate democrat has no such qualms. Those transformations that are democratic and undertaken with broad public support
(either immediately or subsequently manifested) belong within the category of democratic transformation and occupy the sacred space. Those
transformations that do not do so, regardless of how the transformation
was achieved or by whom, cannot be similarly regarded. The distinction
seems altogether more natural to those of us committed to the realization
of the principle of democratic rule than the fruitless search for "intrinsically lawful action[s]" and "contextually appropriate instrument[s]" for
them.1 37
IV.

LIBYA AND THE REALITIES OF THE EXTERNAL INTERVENTION

While the ideas outlined herein may appear to some to be extreme
respecting the causes and nature of external intervention, they are, I
would submit, in some respects reflective of existing American policy in
deed if not quite in word. As such, what is required is not so much some
sort of grand change in policy, but rather an attitudinalshift in favor of
the externally imposed democratic revolution. The problem, to state the
matter forthrightly, is not so much that we are doing the wrong things,
but that we obfuscate respecting our actions. In addition to having the
benefit of meaning what we say, a more honest approach respecting external intervention and external imposition will also permit us to advance
See ALLAWI, supra note 112, at 65 (describing the catastrophic effect of the sanctions).
135.
Derek J. Vanderwood, The Korean Reconciliation Treaty and the German Basic Treaty:
136.
ComparableFoundationsfor Unification?,2 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J.411, 414 (1993).
137.
Reisman, supranote 8, at 89.
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our political values as periodic eruptions such as the Arab Spring arise
from time to time and to assess the extent to which such values should be
compromised by the hard realities of geopolitics.
The recent upheavals in Libya demonstrate the extent to which the
notion that "regime change" need be linked to some "intrinsically lawful
action" has devolved into farce, and a new approach and new understanding is warranted. Libyans had for over forty years suffered under
the cruel and brutal dictatorship of Moammar Al-Qaddafi, whose human
rights record was a string of outrages, from disappearances to extrajudicial executions to the routine use of torture.' 38 There was nothing resembling public participation in government; in fact, political parties were
banned.13 9 It was in this environment that the citizens of Benghazi, taking
advantage of the popular uprisings throughout the region against Arab
autocrats, poured out onto the streets in February of 2011 demanding
their right to alter or abolish the tyranny in which they had lived since
1969. 140
Certainly President Obama articulated a defensible position that
there was a desperate need to intervene to prevent a humanitarian disaster that was alarming, if not close to Rwanda in its scale, when Qaddafi's
forces began to consolidate control over all of Libya following that initial
popular uprising.141 That the Security Council repeated the same humanitarian intervention mantra in its authorization of force was certainly helpful in reinforcing that NATO had undertaken an "intrinsically lawful"
action.142 W en the Arab League repeated the call on similar grounds,
this may have added even greater legitimacy.143 The case for humanitarian intervention at that point was thus plausible enough.
Yet, it is plain that NATO and its member states exceeded such a
mandate many times over. The humanitarian catastrophe in the form of
an assault on Benghazi had passed within only a few weeks of the start of
the intervention, and the conflict swiftly settled into a civil war that became something of a stalemate, a term that even U.S. military officials

138.

See generally BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, U.S. DEP'T OF

STATE,
2009
HUMAN
RIGHTS
REPORT:
LIBYA
(2010),
available
at
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/nea/l36074.htm (describing the various human rights
violations committed in Libya in 2009).
139. Id. at sec. 3.
140. See Anthony Shadid, Cycle of Suppression Rises in Libya and Elsewhere, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 19, 2011, at Al4.
141.
Feller, supra note 1 ("[W]e saw regime forces on the outskirts of the city. We knew that if
we waited one more day, Benghazi-a city nearly the size of Charlotte-could suffer a massacre that
would have reverberated across the region and stained the conscience of the world. It was not in our
national interest to let that happen. I refused to let that happen.").
142.
S.C. Res. 1973, supra note 16.
143.
Ethan Bronner & David E. Sanger, Arab League Endorses No-Flight Zone Over Libya,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2011, at Al.
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did not hesitate to use.1'4 One could readily have imagined at that point
not so much an effort to remove Qaddafi but instead a narrowly circumscribed attempt to create a "safe haven" in Benghazi and to ensure that
Qaddafi was not in a position to threaten a second assault. This is precisely what the United States had done vis-a-vis Iraq's Kurdish region
following its uprising in 1991.145
However, this was hardly what was done in Libya. Admittedly, for
some number of days, the rhetoric remained fixed on the principle of
protecting civilian life, with NATO commanders insisting that they were
not the air wing of the rebel force. 14 6 But this ruse became increasingly
difficult to sustain as NATO began to train and organize rebel forces, 147
as over $1 billion in aid was collected to assist the rebels,14 8 and subsequently, in the middle of the stalemate, the United States recognized the
rebel leadership as the governing authority of Libya and gave it access to
Libyan frozen assets worth $33 billion.149 Even after the rebels cemented
control of Libya's capital, airstrikes continued as the rebels pursued
pockets of resistance in parts of the country loyal to Qaddafi. 50 That this
could have anything to do with civilian protection was preposterous.
Wisely, given these developments, the rhetoric respecting humanitarian intervention began to recede within weeks of the intervention and
abated nearly entirely by its end. The matter was by then described more
forthrightly. Two sides to a conflict had been drawn into stalemate, and
NATO had plainly thrown its weight behind the side that appeared to
represent the democratic aspirations of the Libyan people. Or, to quote
Germany's Foreign Minister upon the decision by that nation to recognize Libya's rebels (the Transitional National Council) as its legitimate
government, "[t]he Transitional Council is the legitimate representation

144.
Adrian Blomfield, Libya: John McCain Calls on U.S. to Recognise Rebel Leadership,
THE TELEGRAPH (Apr. 22, 2011, 7:37 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews
/africaandindianocean/libya/8469027/Libya-John-McCain-calls-on-US-to-recognise-rebelleadership.html (quoting Adm. Mike Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that Libya was
moving towards a "stalemate").
See FAROUK-SLUGLETT & SLUGLETT, supranote 129, at 294-95 (describing the Kurdish
145.
autonomous region after the First Gulf War).
Edward Cody & Leila Fadel, NATO Grudgingly Expresses Regretfor Strike That Killed
146.
Libyan Rebels, WASH. POST, Apr. 9, 2011, at A10 (quoting Deputy Commander of NATO operations in Libya, Rear Adm. Russell Harding, as indicating that "I have to be frank and say it is not for
us, trying to protect civilians, to improve communications with rebel forces").
CJ. Chivers, Inferior Arms Hobble Rebels in Libya War, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2011, at
147.
Al.
148.
Paul Richter, Panetta Sees Extremism Risk in Libya Rebel Panel, L.A. TIMES, June 10,
2011, at A7.
See William Wan & William Booth, Libyan Rebels Given Full U.S. Recognition, WASH.
149.
POST, July 16, 2011, at A9.
Rod Nordland, Waiting Game as Talks Proceed Near a Holdout Town in Libya, N.Y.
150.
TIMES, Sept. 7, 2011, at Al4.
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of the Libyan people... . With this council, we want to support the building of a democratic and law-abiding Libya."' 5 1
Thus, ultimately, NATO support for the rebels' cause was a crucial
element in their victory,152 one that would have been unimaginable not
only if NATO had elected to refrain from its initial airstrikes, but also if
NATO had truly attempted to circumscribe its mission in any reasonable
fashion to avoiding humanitarian disaster. If, by contrast, we assume that
the Libyan rebels were not democratic in impulse and action but instead
unabashed religious fanatics along the lines of the Taliban in Afghanistan
in the manner that Colonel Qaddafi suggested on repeated occasions,"' it
is hard to imagine NATO or any member state within it would have reacted similarly, nor would any committed democrat have urged them to
do so. In such a case, "responsibility to protect" would almost certainly
have led to a very limited set of strikes to avoid civilian massacre but
certainly not to replace Qaddafi's regime, which had tempered its earlier
extremist tendencies, with one broadly sympathetic to Al Qaeda.
What NATO sought, in other words, was a democratic transformation. What it did was act as agent, or co-agent in any event, to that
transformation. It is true that in Libya (as opposed to Iraq or Japan) it
was the people who rose up first and NATO who came to their aid thereafter. Yet this does absolutely nothing to derogate from the fact that there
was an external intervention in the affairs of a sovereign state, and that
intervention, beyond its earliest phases, was directed not at "protecting
civilians," but at democratic transformation.
To deflect this discussion through references to responsibilities to
protect and humanitarian intervention is quite deleterious for a number of
reasons. First of all, it requires nations to obfuscate respecting the nature
of their intervention, which of course can lead to confusion respecting its
ultimate aims. Qaddafi insists preposterously that NATO's ambitions
were colonial.15 4 It is helpful when confronting such nonsense to respond
151. Judy Dempsey, Germany Officially Recognizes Libyan Rebel Government, N.Y. TIMES,
June 14, 2011, at A10; see also Oliver Wright, Three Days to Get Out of the UK-Hague Expels
Libyan
Embassy
Staff
THE
INDEPENDENT
(July
28,
2011),
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/three-days-to-get-out-of-the-uk-ndash-hague-expelslibyan-embassy-staff-2327278.html (quoting the U.K. Foreign Secretary, upon British recognition of
the Transitional National Council, as suggesting that "[t]hrough its actions, the National Transitional
Council has shown its commitment to a more open and democratic Libya").
152. By March 11 of 2011, only weeks into the Libya uprising, it was clear that in the absence
of external military intervention, the rebels in Benghazi would be extinguished by the better armed
and trained Qaddafi forces. See Anthony Shadid, Momentum Shift as Libyan Rebels Flee an Oil
Town, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2011, at Al.
153. Respecting Col. Qaddafi's descriptions, see Richard Spencer, I Am Like the Queen, Says
Gaddafi in Plea to People, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH, Feb. 25, 2011, at 16-17 (quoting Qaddafi as
saying, "It is obvious now that this issue is run by al-Qaeda.... Those armed youngsters, our children, are incited by people who are wanted by America and the Western world.").
154. Dan Murphy, Qaddafi Issues Threats: 'Let Libya Burn', THE CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR
(Sept. 1, 2011), http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Backchannels/2011/0901/Qaddafi-issues-threatsLet-Libya-burn.
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with what one's true aims are as they concern regime change (namely,
democratic transformation), and why they are legitimate, rather than to
obfuscate in turn by claiming the aim of protecting civilians even when
the actions are clearly not directed in such a fashion.
But more importantly, the honest approach permits the recapture of
the sacred ground for democratic transformation. It permits the United
States to establish and proclaim clearly its values, and explain when it
might be derogating from them and why. This is to say, Bahrain's democratic protestors were no less deserving of support from any committed
proponent of democracy than those of Libya. Once we concede, as we
must, that NATO's actions subsequent to its lifting the siege of Benghazi
had nothing to do with humanitarian protection and everything to do with
democracy promotion, then we must concede that Bahrain's restive democrats were normatively entitled to the same support, against a heartless
tyrant whose security forces think nothing of shooting children, detaining
human rights activists, and imprisoning doctors who tend to the wounded.'5 5 It may be that geopolitical considerations counsel against intervention, and that the United States and its NATO allies may not be in any
sort of position to intervene to impose democracy wherever the ground
seems suitably fertile. But let us at least admit to ourselves that this is a
compromise to principle rather than its realization and that our commitments, our sympathies, our ideals, and our vision lie with the democratic
revolutionaries and not with their opponents. Let us, if we can do nothing
else, at least grant to the world's aspiring and repressed democrats their
sacred space, let us honor them properly with our own romantic sympathies with their noble endeavor even if we must, distastefully and in light
of the harsh realities of the world, deal with the tyrants who repress them
as if they were legitimate.
CONCLUSION

There is no doubt that attempts to categorize revolutions, indeed
radical political transformations generally, along neutral process-based
lines obscure our romantic commitment to them and deny them the sacred space to which they are entitled. My own effort is only to expand on
this concept. I want to suggest that our commitment to the transformation
must be precisely the same if the transformation sought is radical reform
or revolution, achieved through deep structural legal change or through
adherence to principles of legality, as these are all but formal procedural
niceties that have little to do with the result that is sought by those demanding change. Indeed, our commitment to the transformation should
also be unaltered if achieved with the support, or even the instigation, of
an external power with subsequent popular endorsement or by a domestic
For a more detailed account of the human rights atrocities to which the people of Bahrain
155.
have been subjected, see sources cited supranote 10.
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force, friendly monarch or professional military, acting with popular
support. In the end, what is at stake is government of, for, and by the
people. How it is achieved, and by whom in the first instance, is of little
consequence.

